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BAN ON COMMUNICATION WITH POTENTIAL
AND ACTUAL CLASS MEMBERS VOIDED AS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL-BERNARD V. GULF OIL CO.
In what could be a landmark decision of significant impact on class action
litigation, the United States Supreme Court unanimously affirmed a well-
reasoned decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc,' had struck down a class action order
explicitly modeled after a provision in the Manual for Complex Litigation.2
The challenged order barred prospective communications between (i) parties
and their counsel and (ii) actual and potential class members. 3 Reversing a
1. Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 619 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1980).
2. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.41, at 188-89 (4th ed. 1977) (supplement to C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1969-1980)) [hereinafter cited as
MANUAL].
3. Specifically, the order provided:
IT IS ORDERED:
(1) That Gulfs motion to modify Judge Steger's Order dated May 28, 1976 is
granted;
(2) That Judge Steger's Order dated May 28, 1976 be modified so as to read as
follows:
In this action, all parties hereto and their counsel are forbidden directly or
indirectly, orally or in writing, to communicate concerning such action with any
potential or actual class member not a formal party to the action without the consent
and approval of the proposed communication and proposed addressees by order of
this Court. Any such proposed communication shall be presented to this Court in
writing with a designation of or description of all addressees and with a motion and
proposed order for prior approval by this Court of the proposed communication.
The communications forbidden by this order include, but are not limited to, (a)
solicitation directly or indirectly of legal representation of potential and actual class
members who are not formal parties to the class action; (b) solicitation of fees and
expenses and agreements to pay fees and expenses from potential and actual class
members who are not formal parties to the class action; (c) solicitation by formal
parties to the class action of requests by members to opt out in class actions under
subparagraph (b)(3) of Rule 23, F.R. Civ. P.; and (d) communications from counsel
or a party which may tend to misrepresent the status, purposes and effects of the
class action, and of any actual or potential Court orders therein which may create
impressions tending, without cause, to reflect adversely on any party, any counsel,
this Court, or the administration of justice. The obligations and prohibitions of this
order are not exclusive. All other ethical, legal and equitable obligations are unaf-
fected by this order.
This order does not forbid (1) communications between an attorney and his
client or a prospective client, who has on the initiative of the client or prospective
client consulted with, employed or proposed to employ the attorney, or (2) commun-
ications occurring in the regular course of business or in the performance of the
duties of a public office or agency (such as the Attorney General) which do not have
the effect of soliciting representation by counsel, or misrepresenting the status,
purposes or effect of the action and orders therein.
If any party or counsel for a party asserts a constitutional right to communicate
with any member of the class without prior restraint and does so communicate
pursuant to that asserted right, he shall within five days after such communication
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year old decision by one of its own panels,4 the Fifth Circuit, in a twenty-one
to one decision, ruled that such a plenary prohibition was an unconstitu-
tional prior restraint of free speech in violation of the first amendment to the
Constitution and Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 5
Before the Fifth Circuit's decision, numerous federal district courts had
adopted similar gag orders, occasionally in the form of local district court
rules. 6 These rules were designed ostensibly as prophylactic measures to
prevent potential class action abuses. These restrictive orders proliferated,
even though the Supreme Court had ruled on five previous occasions that
file with the Court a copy of such communication, if in writing, or an accurate and
substantially complete summary of the communication if oral.
(3) That Gulf be allowed to proceed with the payment of back pay awards and
the obtaining of receipts and releases from those employees covered by the Concilia-
tion Agreement dated April 14, 1976, between Gulf, the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission and the Office for Equal Opportunity, U.S. Department
of the Interior; That the private settlement of charges that the employer has violated
Title VII is to be encouraged, United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Industries, Inc.,
517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944, 96 S. Ct. 1684, 48 L.Ed. 2d
187 (1976).
(4) That the Clerk of the Court mail a notice to all employees of Gulf at its Port
Arthur Refinery who are covered by the Conciliation Agreement and who have not
signed receipts and releases for back pay awards informing them that they have 45
days from the date of the Clerk's notice to accept the offer as provided for by the
Conciliation Agreement or such offer will expire until further order of the Court;
(5) That the contents of the notice be the same as that set out in Appendix I;
(6) That Gulf bear the expense of mailing the notice and a copy of the Court's
order to the individuals covered by item (4) above;
(7) That all employees who have delivered receipts and releases to Gulf on or
before 55 days from the date of the Clerk's notice shall be deemed to have accepted
the offer as contained in the Conciliation Agreement;
(8) That any further communication, either direct or indirect, oral or in writ-
ing (other than those permitted pursuant to paragraph (2) above) from the named
parties, their representatives or counsel to the potential or actual class members not
formal parties to this action is forbidden;
(9) That Gulf inform the Court 65 days from the date of the Clerk's notice to be
sent by the Clerk of the Court of the names of potential or actual class members who
have accepted the offer of back pay and signed receipts and releases pursuant to the
Conciliation Agreement and the names of those who have refused or failed to
respond.
It is Plaintiffs contention that any such provisions as hereinbefore stated that
limit communication with potential class members are constitutionally invalid,
citing Rodgers v. United States Steel Corporation, 508 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 969, 95 S. Ct. 1386, 43 L.Ed.2d 649 (1975). This Court finds that
the Rodgers case is inapplicable, and that this order comports with the requisites set
out in the Manual or Complex Litigation, Section 1.41, p. 106 CCH Edition 1973,
which specifically exempts constitutionally protected communication when the sub-
stance of such communication is filed with the Court.
619 F.2d at 464 n.4.
4. Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 596 F.2d 1249, vacated, 604 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1979).
5. 619 F.2d at 463.
6. See, e.g., the following local federal district court rules: S.D. FLA. 19(8); N.D. GA.
221.2, 221.3; D. MD. 20; W.D. WAsH. 23(g).
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some communication between class counsel and potential class members
clearly constituted constitutionally protected speech.7
Since the Fifth Circuit's decision, some district courts have either reversed
standing restrictions on class action communications or denied motions for
such restraints." In other jurisdictions, however, local ban orders remain
untouched. For example, one court concluded that, notwithstanding
Bernard, the ABA ethical standards bar such communications.'
Quite appropriately, the United States Supreme Court granted a writ of
certiorari in Gulf Oil Company v. Bernard.10 Unfortunately, the Court
affirmed the Fifth Circuit on the basis of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, rather than on the basis of the first amendment. Thus, the
Court's opinion failed to clarify important issues in class action litigation."
Indeed, the decision adds further confusion to an area of law that is already
plagued by inconsistent practices of questionable constitutionality.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In April, 1976, Gulf Oil Company and the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission (EEOC) entered into an extrajudicial conciliation agree-
ment relating to Gulf's alleged racial discrimination at its Port Arthur, Texas
plant. 2 The agreement provided for conciliation of alleged discriminatory
practices and for back pay to 643 present and former black employees in
return for the employees' agreement to release Gulf from any possible claims
of employment discrimination."a In May, 1976, six present or retired black
7. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401
U.S. 576 (1971); United Mine Workers, Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1968);
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
8. Kilgo v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 88 F.R.D. 592 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Garside v. Everest &
Jennings, No. S-80-82 MLS (E.D. Cal. 1980).
9. Impervious Paint Indus. v. Ashland Oil, 508 F. Supp. 720 (W.D. Ky. 1981).
10. 449 U.S. 1033 (1980).
11. Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 101 S.Ct. 2193 (1981).
12. Id. at 2195.
13. Id. Gulf solicited releases from the black employees through letters like the following:
May 1, 1976
Dear (name of employee):
In line with its continuing policy of providing equal opportunity to all employees
and annuitants, Gulf has recently entered into an agreement with the United States
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the U.S. Department of the
Interior. As part of the written agreement, Gulf has identified certain employees and
annuitants to whom back pay will be offered in settlement of past discrimination
claims, even though Gulf does not admit to having discriminated against anyone.
You are a member of this group of employees and annuitants, and should you accept
the terms of this offer, you will immediately receive by certified mail $1,163.34 less
legal deductions for social security, if applicable, and income tax. The amount of
your back pay was figured according to your plant seniority date, and very probably
will not be the same as that of anyone else presented an offer under the agreement.
Because this offer is personal in nature, Gulf asks that you not discuss it with
others. Gulf will likewise respect your complete privacy by not disclosing the amount
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employees of the Port Arthur plant brought a class action against Gulf under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, charging a variety of discriminatory
practices.14 According to Gulf, the issues in the suit were almost identical to
those provided for in the conciliation agreement.'
5
Prior to answering, Gulf filed a request asking the district court to enter an
order restricting communications by parties and their counsel with actual or
potential class members because of some allegedly improper communications
between class counsel and putative class members.' In an unsworn brief,
Gulf claimed that one of the plaintiffs' attorneys had attended a meeting
with black Gulf employees who were potential class members. According to
Gulf, the attorney urged the group not to sign releases sent to them in
connection with the conciliation agreement negotiated between Gulf and the
EEOC and allegedly represented that he could recover twice as much for
them in the class action.' 7 Plaintiffs' attorneys denied the charges.' 8
The district court, on May 28, 1976, entered a temporary order imposing
the requested restraint.' 9 The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of
offered you to other employees or annuitants. Even though both you and Gulf may
feel that you have not been discriminated against in any way by Gulf, the money is
available to you upon acceptance. To help you make a decision, Gulf wants you to
understand that the only condition for accepting back pay is that you sign a written
statement releasing Gulf from any possible claims of employment discrimination
occurring before the date of your release, including any future effects or alleged past
practices. Of course, in all other ways you will retain full rights to administrative
and legal processes.
Enclosed you will find a written "Receipt and General Release". You may imme-
diately receive your back pay check by completing all questions on the Receipt and
General Release, signing before a Notary Public and returning it in the self-ad-
dressed envelope provided. Services of a Notary Public will be provided at no charge
by calling. . . .Once you have returned the signed Receipt and General Release, you
should receive your check by mail within 7 to 10 days.
If you feel that you cannot respond because you do not understand Gulf's offer,
you may contact ...during normal business hours, to arrange an interview with a
government representative who will answer your questions.
Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amicus
Curiae at la-2a, Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 101 S. Ct. 2193 (1981).
14. 101 S. Ct. at 2195-96. The class consisted of all black employees now employed or
formerly employed by Gulf Oil Company at its plant in Port Arthur, Texas, and all black
applicants for employment at Gulf Oil Company who have been rejected for employment at the
company. Id. at 2195.
15. 619 F.2d at 464. Plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief and damages. They
charged that Gulf discriminated against blacks in hiring and job assignments, employed discrim-
inatory tests, paid inequitably, employed racially discriminating promotion and progression
practices, denied blacks training and seniority, and discriminatorily discharged and disciplined
blacks. Further, they alleged that the union had condoned Gulf's practices. 596 F.2d at 1263
(Godbold, J., concurring and dissenting).
16. 101 S. Ct. at 2196.
17. Id.
18. 596 F.2d at 1254.
19. 619 F.2d at 464. Judge Steger, sitting in Chief Judge Fisher's absence, entered the
original order that prohibited all communication without exception. 596 F.2d at 1258.
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the order, 20 but on June 22, the Chief District Judge of the Eastern District of
Texas, without entering findings of fact or requiring Gulf to prove its un-
sworn charges, rejected plaintiffs' arguments and entered a modified order
explicitly modeled on the suggested order in the Manual.21 With some excep-
tions, the modified order imposed a pervasive ban on communication be-
tween all parties, their counsel, and potential or actual class members.2 2 A
significant exception to the ban allowed Gulf to continue communications
with class members and to solicit releases in exchange for back pay awards
under the terms of the conciliation agreement.
23
On July 6, 1976, plaintiffs' counsel requested that the court allow counsel
and their clients to communicate with members of the proposed class. 24 Filed
with the motion was a notice that plaintiffs proposed to distribute to Gulf's
black employees, alerting them that the lawsuit was an alternative to the
Gulf/EEOC conciliation agreement and urging them to contact an attor-
ney. 25 The deadline for accepting the conciliation offer expired August 8,
1976.26 In a single sentence order on August 10, the district court denied
plaintiffs' motion. 27
Following entry of the order, the district court granted summary judg-
ment in response to defendants' motion and dismissed the complaint in
January, 1977.28 On appeal, plaintiffs challenged both the summary dis-
missal and the district court's order restricting communications. On June 15,
1979, a panel of the Fifth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment
20. 619 F.2d at 464. Plaintiffs argued that the order was an unconstitutional prior restraint
and that the district court lacked authority to issue it.
21. Id.
22. Se' note 3 supra.
23. 10lt S. Ct. at 2197. See note 3 supra, at (3) & (7). For a copy of one of the solicitation
letters, see note 13 supra.
24. 101 S. Ct. at 2198.
25. Id. The proposed notice read as follows:
ATTENTION BLACK WORKERS OF GULF OIL
The Company has asked you to sign a release. If you do, you may be giving up
very important civil rights. It is important that you fully understand what you are
getting in return for the release. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU TALK TO A
LAWYER BEFORE YOU SIGN. These lawyers will talk to you FOR FREE:
[names and addresses of respondents' counsel].
These lawyers represent six of your fellow workers in a lawsuit titled Bernard v.
Gulf Oil Co., which was filed in Beaumont Federal Court on behalf of all of you.
This suit seeks to correct fully the alleged discriminatory practices of Gulf.
Even if you have already signed the release, talk to a lawyer. You may consult
another attorney. If necessary, have him contact the above-named lawyers for more
details. All discussions will be kept strictly confidential.
AGAIN, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU TALK TO A LAWYER. Whatever
your decision might be, we will continue to vigorously prosecute this lawsuit in order
to correct all the alleged discriminatory practices at Gulf Oil.
101 S. Ct. at 2198 n.6.
26. Id. at 2198.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 2198 n.8.
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and remanded the case, but upheld the communication ban as a permissible
exercise of the district court's discretionary power to control class actions.2 9
Plaintiffs subsequently asked the entire Fifth Circuit to reconsider the
panel's decision, and a rehearing en banc was granted. 30 Upon reconsidera-
tion, the court of appeals adopted the earlier panel's reversal of the lower
court's summary judgment ruling and adopted the remand. 3' By a vote of
twenty-one to one, however, the full court rejected the panel's position on
the communication ban. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court's
order, restricting communications by named plaintiffs and their counsel with
actual or potential class members, violated the first amendment because the
ban was an unconstitutional prior restraint of speech. 32 Furthermore, the
court declared that the ban violated Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 33
On December 8, 1980, the United States Supreme Court granted a writ of
certiorari 34 to decide the question of whether a district court judge presiding
over a class action may constitutionally restrict plaintiffs or their counsel
from discussing the case with potential or actual class members in order to
prevent abuse of the class action device. 35 A unanimous Supreme Court held
29. 596 F.2d 1249, 1254 (5th Cir. 1979). Following entry of the order the defendants had
moved to dismiss the complaint. The court ordered that the motion be treated as a motion for
summary judgment and granted summary judgment in January, 1977. Id. On appeal, the
plaintiffs challenged dismissal by the district judge of plaintiffs' Title VII and § 1981 claims, the
district court's application of laches to the Title VII claim, and the propriety of the order
restricting the parties' communication with members of the putative class. A Fifth Circuit panel
held that the district court erred in dismissing the individual Title VII claims of two of the
named plaintiffs and erred in dismissing the class claims (Part I), id.; erred in holding that the
statute of limitations totally barred plaintiffs' § 1981 claims (Part II), id. at 1256; improperly
applied the doctrine of laches, finding unreasonable delay and prejudice on plaintiffs' part where
there was none (Part Ill), id. at 1258; and correctly exercised its power to control class action
litigation by entering the order restricting communications (Part IV). id. at 1262.
30. 604 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1979).
31. 619 F.2d at 463. The Fifth Circuit adopted parts I, 11, and III of the panel opinion. See
note 29 supra.
32. 619 F.2d at 466-78.
33. Id. at 478.
34. 449 U.S. 1033 (1980).
35. The question for review as presented by Gulf, read as follows:
Whether during the pendency of a class action, a United States district court can
constitutionally enter an order limiting certain communications between plaintiffs
or their attorneys and potential or actual class members not yet formal parties to the
action, in order to prevent actual and potential abuse of the class action device.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at II, Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 101 S. Ct. at 2193 (1981). The
respondents did not accept Gulf's formulation of the issue, and instead submitted the following:
Whether the district court's several orders restraining communication by plaintiffs
and their attorneys with members of the potential class in this civil rights action
violated the Constitution or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, where there were
no findings of any improper conduct by plaintiffs or their counsel, the uncontra-
dicted evidence demonstrates no misconduct by them, and no evidentiary hearing
was ever held.
Brief For Respondents at i, Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 101 S. Ct. 2193 (1981). The Court granted
certiorari to the question in Gulfs petition.
that in imposing the gag order the district court had abused its discretion
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court found that the order
was inconsistent with the general policies embodied in Rule'23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and was not based on either a clear record or
specific findings of abuse. 36 Unlike the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court
confined its decision to the issue of what authority the district courts have
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to impose sweeping bans on
communications in class actions. Consequently, the Court did not address
the constitutional issue of whether orders such as the one entered by the
district court are prior restraints on speech and thus forbidden by the first
amendment.
37
Although the Supreme Court's decision remedied the abuse of judicial
discretion in the Bernard case, its holding was a narrow one. 38 The Court
had the opportunity to issue a decision of significant impact on the course of
class action litigation. The decision it rendered, however, left the door open
for the continued imposition of communication bans by district courts and
the attendant potential for prior restraint of constitutionally protected
speech.
Communication Restraints in Class Actions
The class action is a device that allows one representative "to step forward
and sue on behalf of all," 39 thereby aggregating substantially similar claims
and prorating the cost of litigation among numerous litigants. The device
originated at common law and was codified in the federal district court
system in 1937 with the adoption of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 40 by the United States Supreme Court. The class action provides a
forum for those who would otherwise find it virtually impossible to litigate
their rights individually.
Not every case is appropriate for treatment as a class action. The prerequi-
sites that must be satisfied for a case to be certified as a class action under
Rule 23 are complicated and extensive. 4' In view of the factors a court must
36. 101 S. Ct. 2193 (1981).
37. "[Plrior to reading any constitutional questions, federal courts must consider nonconsti-
tutional grounds for decision." 101 S. Ct. at 2199.
38. 101 S. Ct. at 2202 n.21.
39. Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. Cii. L. REV.
684, 691 (1941). The class suit is an affirmative technique, over and above joinder, for bringing
all litigants into a case and, if successful, "making recovery available to all." Id. at 688. Its
apparent purposes include judicial economy, uniformity of decision and provision of forum.
Schorr, Class Actions: The Right to Solicit, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 215, 220 (1976).
40. On December 20, 1937, the Supreme Court adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure pursuant to the Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064. 302 U.S. 783 (1937).
41. Rule 23 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
1981] BERNARD 923
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:917
weigh in deciding whether to certify a class, it is not unusual for a class
certification question to be decided a year or more after a class action
complaint is filed. 42 In the interim, the parties may engage in limited discov-
ery to crystallize the issues to be litigated, examine the nature of the class
claims, determine the estimated class size, and examine the adequacy of the
class representative.
During the period between the filing of the complaint and the decision on
class certification, the class counsel's duties to the class members are unclear.
Because of the obligation to represent the interests of absent class members,
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may lye maintained as a class action if
the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the
class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of
the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party
opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a
practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the
adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their inter-
ests: or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to tile class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corres-
ponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) tile court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a
class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudica-
tion of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest
of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of
separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the contro-
versy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or
undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum;
(D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be Maintained; Notice;
Judgment; Actions Conducted Partially as Class Actions.
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct
to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances,
including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable
effort . ..
42. Interestingly, while many class suits are filed, few are ever fully litigated. -Most class
actions for damages are either dismissed before trial or settled, and injunctive decrees may be
negotiated, even if liability is adjudicated." Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARv.
L. REV. 1318, 1373-74 (1976). A statistical study of class actions brought within the District
Court for the District of Columbia showed that 44 cases out of 81, or 55%, were disposed of on a
motion to dismiss or for summary judgment for the defendant. Three of the 81 cases, or 3.7%,
resulted in judgment for the defendant after trial. Note, The Rule 23(b)(3) Class Action: An
Empirical Study, 62 GEO. L.J. 1123, 1136-37 (1974). See also, Furth & Burns, The Anatomy of a
Seventy Million Dollar Sherman Act Settlement-A Law Professor's Tape-Talk With Plaintiff's
Trial Counsel, 23 DEPAUL L. REV. 865, 880 (1974) (litigator observes that most antitrust class
actions are settled).
BERNARD
class counsel must treat them as clients and avoid compromising their rights.
At the same time, however, contact initiated by class counsel in some in-
stances can be viewed as unethical direct solicitation of clients, especially if
the purpose or effect of the contact is to discourage a decision to drop out of
the class. 43 Moreover, unauthorized direct or indirect communications from
counsel or a party might confuse actual and potential class members, perhaps
leading to circumstances that might have an adverse effect on the class'
rights. 44
To prevent these potential abuses of the class action process, several fed-
eral district courts 45 have adopted local rules permitting orders that restrict,
in whole or in part, communications between all counsel to an action and
any potential or actual class member who is not a formal party to the action.
Most of these local rules are modeled on a suggested order in the Manual For
Complex Litigation.46 Additionally, some federal judges sitting in districts
where there are no such local rules have issued similar orders restricting class
action communications.
47
To further complicate matters, Disciplinary Rule 7-104 (DR 7-104) of the
American Bar Association Model Code of Professional Responsibility forbids
an attorney to communicate on the subject of representation with a party he
knows to be represented by counsel in that matter without the prior consent
of the party's lawyer, or to give advice to a person not represented by counsel
if the interests of such person are, or might come in conflict with those of his
client. 48 For example, in a decision rendered after the Fifth Circuit's Bernard
decision, the District Court for the Western District of Kentucky49 read DR
7-104 to mean that defense counsel must treat even potential class members
as clients of the class counsel and therefore, must refrain from communica-
ting with potential class members from the date the complaint is filed. 50
43. Impervious Paint Indus., Inc. v. Ashland Oil, 508 F. Supp. 720 (W.D. Ky. 1981).
44. Schorr, Class Actions: The Right to Solicit, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 215 (1976).
45. See note 6 supra.
46. See note 2 supra.
47. See, e.g., Weight Watchers of Phila., Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 455 F.2d 770
(2d Cir. 1972); Impervious Paint Indus., Inc. v. Ashland Oil, 508 F. Supp. 720 (W.D. Ky.
1981).
48. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104 (1979). The Code of Professional
Responsibility was adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association on August
12, 1969. The Disciplinary Rules are mandatory in character. They "state the minimum level of
conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action." Id.
Preamble at 1. (emphasis added). Standing alone, the Code has no force and effect; it serves only
as a guide. "Enforcement of legal ethics and disciplinary procedures are local matters securely
within the jurisdictional prerogative of each state and the District of Columbia." ABA Comm.
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility Informal Op. 1420, at 5 (1978).
49. Impervious Paint Indus., Inc. v. Ashland Oil, 508 F. Supp. 720 (W.D. Ky. 1981).
50. Id. at 722-23. Impervious Paint involved consolidated multiple-defendant civil antitrust
actions that proceeded as a class action. At the time of class certification, the court entered a
standard gag order designed to prevent potential abuses of class actions. Like the order in the
MANUAL, supra note 2, an authority upon which the court relied heavily, the order required
court approval prior to contact of class members by parties or counsel. Certain defendants then
1981]
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ANALYSIS
While the district court in Bernard never attempted to explain why it
imposed a plenary limitation on class communications, the court of appeals
concluded that the limitation was based on suggestions in the Manual.
51
These suggestions were designed to prevent the possible solicitation and
misrepresentation abuses noted above. It was due to the pervasive influence
of the Manual in espousing such preemptory restrictions, and the absence of
other rulings on the constitutionality of the Manual's suggested restriction,
moved to vacate that order citing Bernard as support. The court agreed with the Bernard
decision and the defendant's argument that the order was broader than allowed by the first
amendment, and vacated the communications ban. 508 F. Supp. at 722. Thereafter, plaintiffs'
counsel became aware that representatives of one of the defendants had begun contacting its own
customers who were also class members. Defendants' purpose was to discuss the suit and the class
members' part therein. The court dismissed plaintiffs' unsupported allegations that these contacts
were actually threats of commercial retaliation directed against class members. The court did
focus, however, on the substance and the origin of these contacts, ultimately finding that defense
counsel had run afoul of DR 7-104. Customer contacts included explanation of the class notice,
reminders of the need to affirmatively opt out if the member decided not to remain in the class,
advice that evidentiary proof of claim would be required in order to recover and advice that a
class member who did not opt out might be subject to discovery. Id.
The court accepted as undisputed that defendants' counsel neither contacted any class member
nor instructed the corporation's representatives to do so. Nevertheless, the court concluded that
the counsel must have had full knowledge of their clients' activities and, in dereliction of their
duty under DR 7-104, did not advise against this activity. Id. at 723. As a result, the court
ordered that any of the class members who had been contacted by the defendant and had
subsequently elected to opt out of the class must be restored to the class, be informed of
defendant's "impropriety", and be given an additional period within which to make a decision to
remain or again opt out.
The district court distinguished In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978), saying that the advance-
ment of political beliefs and issues was the issue in Primus but not in impervious Paint. The court
then analogized the case to Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978), finding that the
contacts were made for pecuniary gain. Each of those cases, however, involved contacts with
class members made by lawyers. Further, the disciplinary rules cited by the court as its authority
for sanctioning the defendant, apply only to lawyers. See note 48 supra. The contacts in
Impervious Paint, in contrast, were made by corporate representatives. Yet, on the basis of
"circumstantial indications", the court was willing to tie counsel for the defendants to the alleged
improper acts of its clients so that the court could use these authorities to apply sanctions. 508 F.
Supp. at 723.
Finally, and perhaps most distressingly, the district court made a weak attempt to distinguish
Bernard, a decision which it had previously cited as its authority for vacating a gag order based
on the MANUAL, supra note 2, only to replace it with an even broader gag order based on the
considerations of DR 7-104. The district court, while previously reading Bernard to hold that
blanket gag orders in class actions constitute unconstitutional prior restraints of speech, harmo-
nized that ruling by finding that the "exceptional circumstances" and likelihood of "direct,
immediate and irreparable harm" in this case allowed it to enter a prior restraint in conformity
with Bernard. 508 F. Supp. at 723. In Bernard, however, the Fifth Circuit went through a long
and careful analysis of the facts in the case, weighing first amendment rights of free expression
against the potential for abuse. In Impervious Paint the district court merely assumed that
because some of the contacted class members had elected to opt out of the class they had
therefore been forced to do so. The court cited no evidence for its assumption. "[The] contacts
appear to have been quite effective, since an extraordinary percentage of the opt-outs are [the
contacted] customers." Id.
51. 619 F.2d at 466.
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that the Fifth Circuit addressed the constitutionality of the district court's
order. 52
When the district court ordered the entry of a gag order modeled after the
order in the Manual, it balanced the interest in unrestrained communication
against the interest in the orderly administration of justice. 53 The Fifth
Circuit rejected this balance, however, and invalidated the restriction be-
cause (i) the rule constituted a prior restraint on freedom of speech; (ii) the
speech at issue was constitutionally protected; and (iii) the restraint failed to
meet the previously articulated standards governing restriction of constitu-
tionally protected expression. 54
The Supreme Court struck down the order merely because it represented
an abuse of judicial discretion. Consequently, the Court never reached the
question of the constitutionality of imposing plenary communication bans in
class action suits. Because of its unwillingness to examine such bans in light of
the first amendment's prohibitions against prior restraints, the Court has
effectively acquiesced to their continued use. Indeed, the Court, in one of its
two brief references to the first amendment, merely observed "that the order
involved serious restraints on expression" and the Court counseled "caution
on the part of a District Court in drafting such an order." 55
A careful reading of the Supreme Court's decision suggests that the district
court's single major transgression was merely its adoption of the order sug-
gested by the Manual without specific findings of abuse.56 The Supreme
Court's opinion in Bernard reflects a surprising tolerance for prior restraints
in class actions. The Court's admonition that the district court should have
weighed the need for a limitation on speech against the potential for interfer-
ence with the rights of the parties is merely a license for district courts to
continue issuing such bans on meager findings of abuse.
In a footnote, the Court explained that "[f]ull consideration of the consti-
tutional issue should await a case with a fully developed record of possible
abuses of the class action device." 57 Ironically, the Court had a perfect
record of abuse before it in Bernard. The abuse was not solicitation of
plaintiffs or of the class by plaintiffs' counsel. Rather, the abuse in Bernard
sprang directly from the district court's use of its own order to prevent
potential class members from receiving information about the existence of a
52. Id. at 466-67.
53. MANUAL, supra note 2, Part I.
54. 619 F.2d at 467-74.
55. 101 S. Ct. at 2202.
56. 101 S. Ct. at 2201. It is not surprising that the district court entered its order without
findings or even proof of abuse. The MANUAL encourages courts to adopt local rules that ban all
unapproved communication by formal parties or their counsel with potential and actual class
members. In short, the MANUAL encourages blanket communication bans in class actions to be
the rule in all courts. Under this theory, once a class action is filed, only proposed written
communications, submitted to and approved by court order, may pass to potential and actual
class members. Thus, communication becomes the exception, not the rule. MANUAL, supra note
2, Part I, § 1.41.
57. 101 S. Ct. at 2200 n.15.
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lawsuit designed to adjudicate their rights. 5 Furthermore, that order was
entered not on proof that plaintiffs or their counsel had engaged in abusive
practices, but on the mere possibility of abuse-a possibility that was never
substantiated or proven.5 9
Moreover, the order was one-sided. The order enjoined plaintiffs and their
counsel from informing potential class members of an alternative to Gulf's
conciliation agreement. Gulf, however, was allowed to continue to solicit
releases of all discrimination claims from those same class members.6 0 In-
deed, on Gulf's own motion the district court, without findings, modified its
original blanket ban to allow Gulf to continue contacting class members
regarding its settlement offer. Yet, when the plaintiffs requested permission
to contact those same individuals to inform them of an alternative to Gulf's
offer, the district court effectively quashed the class action by denying plain-
tiffs' motion two days after the deadline for class members to accept Gulf's
offer. 61
The Supreme Court could not have been presented with a clearer pattern
of abuse or a more blatant restriction on speech than it had in Bernard. The
best way to analyze what the Supreme Court failed to do is to examine the
Fifth Circuit's reasoning. Ironically, when the Fifth Circuit declared the
district court's gag order an unconstitutional prior restraint, it was following
precepts of constitutional law embodied in past Supreme Court decisions.
Prior Restraints on Free Speech
The order entered by the district court in Bernard2 and the type of order
set forth in the Manual13 are classic examples of what the Supreme Court has
consistently held to be prior restraints on speech. A prior restraint is gener-
ally defined as a formal prohibition on speech "imposed in advance of
utterance or publication." ' 4 Over two hundred years ago Blackstone cited
the protection of freedom of speech as essential to the viability of a free state
and as the rationale for protecting citizens against prior restraints.6 5 Because
58. 619 F.2d at 464. The district court waited until two days after the deadline for accepting
Gulf's conciliation agreement to inform plaintiffs and their counsel of the denial of their motion
to inform class members that an alternative to signing the agreement existed. Id.
59. 619 F.2d at 464.
60. See note 13 supra.
61. See note 57 supra.
62. See note 3 supra.
63. See note 2 supra.
64. See Litwack, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 12 HAnV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV., 519, 520
(1977).
65. Blackstone stated:
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state: but this
consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from
censure for criminal matter when published. Every freeman has an undoubted right
to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public: to forbid this, is to destroy
freedom of the press: but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous or illegal, he
must take the consequence of his own temerity.
4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAPrIS* 151-52 (emphasis in original).
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prior restraints bar information and ideas from reaching the public, the
Supreme Court has interpreted them as one of the primary evils against
which the first amendment was directed.66
The underlying theory is that a prior restraint is a more restrictive alterna-
tive than subsequent punishment.6 7 It has been said that a system of prior
restraints, in contrast to a subsequent punishment, is likely to bring under
government scrutiny a wider range of expression; is likely to repress com-
munication; is more likely to be applied than suppression through criminal
process; lacks the procedural safeguards of the criminal justice system; and
generally tends toward excesses like all forms of censorship. s 8
Foremost among the objections to prior restraints is the tremendous discre-
tion given to one individual.66 Further, while the unconstitutionality of a
statute may be raised as a defense by one guilty of its violation after the
fact,70 a litigant who disobeys an injunction is guilty of contempt and is
66. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 556 (1976); Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393
U.S. 175. 181 (1968). The Court has interpreted the first amendment to provide special protec-
tion against specific court orders that prohibit the publication of particular information. Al-
though prior restraints are not unconstitutional per se, they are viewed as "bearing a heavy
presumption against . . .constitutional validity." Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58,
70 (1963). See also Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971).
67. The Court has reasoned:
[A] free society prefers to punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they break
the law than to throttle them and all others beforehand. It is always difficult to
know in advance what an individual will say, and the line between legitimate and
illegitimate speech is often so finely drawn that the risks of freewheeling censorship
are formidable.
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975) (emphasis in original).
In situations where a prior restraint is imposed in advance of a final judicial determination on
the merits, the Court has said that the restraint must "be limited to preservation of the status quo
for the shortest fixed period compatible with sound judicial resolution." Freedman v. Maryland,
380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965). But the temporary nature of a restraint does not remove from the party
wishing to impose it the burden of showing justification for the prior restraint. Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
68. T. EMERSON, TiIE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 506 (1970).
69. In Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), the Supreme Court struck down
a Minnesota statute, the operation and effect of which the Court said constituted the essence of
censorship. Under the statutory scheme, a newspaper or periodical could be suppressed for
publishing charges of official misconduct against public officials. Any further publication of such
charges would constitute a contempt and thus a restraint upon the publisher. The publisher's
only recourse was to satisfy a court of the validity of the charges and of his intention in publishing
them. Id. at 712-13.
In Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963), a publisher of books and pamphlets,
which were banned as immoral by a state commission, was not entitled to notice and hearing
before his publications were labled as objectionable. Moreover, the system contained no provi-
sion for judicial review of the commission's determination. The Court held that this system of
prior administrative restraint was actually a form of "informal censorship" which was constitu-
tionally proscribed. Id. at 70-71. Later, in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), the Court
noted that "[b]ecause the censor's business is to censor, there inheres the danger that he may well
be less responsive than a court" to protecting free expression. Id. at 57-58. Further, the Court
said, the censor's determination may become final if judicial review is not readily accessible. Id.
70. In Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969), the Supreme Court held
that a law subjecting the right of free expression in public places to the prior restraint of a license,
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precluded from raising constitutional invalidity as a defense in subsequent
proceedings. 7 ' The Supreme Court has called this an "immediate and irre-
versible sanction. 72 Whereas the threat of subsequent criminal or civil sanc-
tions for violation of a statute chills speech, 73 those sanctions are only im-
posed after the violation and after all avenues of judicial review have been
exhausted. A prior restraint, on the other hand, "freezes speech"' 74 before it is
expressed.
The Supreme Court in Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad75 explic-
itly recognized that governmental action need not totally inhibit expression
to constitute a prior restraint. If a restriction on one's chosen manner of
expression significantly restricts or impairs communication, it may constitute
a prior restraint by inhibiting speech notwithstanding the availability of
alternative means of communication. 7 Moreover, a prior restraint forces a
delay in publication or communication until there is a judicial determination
of the validity of the information to be disseminated.7 7 Depending upon the
nature of the speech, first amendment rights are often lost or prejudiced by
delay.7 8
without narrow standards is unconstitutional, and a person faced with such a law may ignore it
and exercise his first amendment rights. The Constitution will not deny one who has disobeyed a
statute the right to challenge its constitutionality. Id. at 151.
71. As one commentator noted: "[A] court order must be obeyed until it is set aside ....
[P]ersons subject to the order who disobey it may not defend against the ensuing charge of
criminal contempt on the ground that the order was erroneous or even unconstitutional."
Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29 STAN. L. REV. 539, 552 (1977).
In Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967), the Supreme Court held that civil
rights marchers who had been enjoined by an Alabama circuit court from participating in street
parades were not justified in disobeying the injunction prior to its orderly judicial review. Even
though the Court saw the breadth and vagueness of the injunction as subject to constitutional
question, the proper way to raise the question was to apply to the state courts for modification or
dissolution of the injunction. The Fifth Circuit has applied this rule of law to a court order
forbidding publication of evidence taken at a hearing. United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496
(5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 979 (1973). In Dickinson, the Fifth Circuit held that the
district court had power to punish reporters who flagrantly disregarded its orders even though
the order itself violated the first amendment.
72. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
76. "Whether petitioner might have sued some other, privately owned, theater in the city for
the production is of no consequence . . . . '[O]ne is not to have the exercise of his liberty of
expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other
place.' " Id. at 556 (quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939)).
77. See Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 184-85 (1968); Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 71 (1963).
78. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 609 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
Gulf actually argued in its brief to the Supreme Court that delay is meaningless when critical
communications are involved. "If after the ... order is entered, the court fails to allow critical
communications to reach absent class members, the appellate courts can correct the error upon
final appeal." Brief for the Petitioners at 21 n.15, Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 101 S.Ct. 2193
(1981). Gulf cited Oswald v. McGarr, 620 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1980), to support its rather
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Using a definition originally articulated by the Seventh Circuit in Chicago
Council of Lawyers v. Bauer7 9 the Fifth Circuit in Bernard described prior
restraint as a "predetermined judicial prohibition restraining specified ex-
pression."8' s The appeals court in Bernard articulated four features that
distinguish prior restraints from limitations on free speech imposed by subse-
quent restraints: (1) origin, a prior restraint is generally judicial rather than
legislative in origin;8' (2) purpose: a prior restraint has as its purpose suppres-
sion of communication; 2 (3) means of enforcement: punishment by con-
tempt, absent the traditional safeguards of the criminal justice system, is the
intended means of enforcement;83 (4) means of constitutional challenge:
those who choose to disobey a court order cannot raise its constitutional
invalidity as a defense.8 4 Every one of these features was manifest in the
district court's order in Bernard, and each of these characteristics embraces
vices that counsel against the continued imposition of prior restraints in class
actions.
Origin
The order in Bernard was "undeniably judicial in origin."' 85 Not only did
the order originate from the trial court, but it also placed the judicial
administration of a crucial aspect of the suit in the hands of the judge. Along
with ruling on class certification86 and discovery matters prior to trial, a trial
judge decides through promulgation of the order what communication, if
any, should be restricted. The problem that the Fifth Circuit saw in the
judicial nature of the order is that it placed tremendous discretion in one
remarkable assertion. In Oswald, the Seventh Circuit refused to vacate a district court order
approving a notice that detailed a settlement offer to individual subclass members. Unlike
Bernard, the class had already been certified. Furthermore, the order in Oswald informed class
members that they could accept a settlement as an alternative to remaining in the class. Id. at
1193. In Bernard, the district court's order prevented potential class members from learning that
a possible class action was an alternative to the settlement offered to them. Furthermore, Gulf,
by citing Oswald implies that any prejudicial orders entered in this litigation can be corrected
"on review of the final judgment." Id. This litigation was filed in 1976. It still has not reached
trial. In fact, no class has been certified because plaintiffs were prevented from forming one.
Without a class there will never be a trial, much less a final judgment to appeal. If, indeed, final
judgment is ever reached, there is little hope that an appellate court could effectively remedy a
wrong done six years ago to a group of individuals who released their employer from all
discrimination claims because they did not realize there was an alternative way to proceed. To
suggest, as Gulf does, that these individuals would not be harmed by this delay is to ignore the
realities of this case.
79. 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
80. 522 F.2d at 248.
81. 619 F.2d at 467-68.
82. Id. at 468.
83. Id. at 468-69.
84. Id. at 469-70.
85. Id. at 468.
86. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).
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individual to censor specific communications.8 7 At least one commentator
has suggested that recognizing one individual as a censor leads to the inescap-
able conclusion that some communication will be suppressed.8" In the
Bernard litigation the district judge exercised his powers of censorship
through the restriction order only once. That single exercise, however, effec-
tively terminated the class suit's existence and removed a viable alternative
for Gulf's black employees. 9
Purpose
Clearly, the purpose of the district court's order was to suppress both
direct and indirect communication between counsel or parties and the actual
or potential class members.9 ° As the Fifth Circuit observed, however, it is far
less objectionable to punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they
break the law than to stifle the rights of all in anticipation of the possible
misdeeds of a few. 9'
The events in Bernard exemplify the inherent evil of preemptory suppres-
sion. Because of the factual similarities of Bernard, NAACP v. Button, and
In re Primus, 2 the Fifth Circuit concluded that the communication sup-
pressed by the district court order in Bernard would be protected by the
holdings in those cases. 93 The possible solicitation of funds by the NAACP
was discounted by the court because plaintiffs' counsel received no compen-
sation from class members for their services. 94 Moreover, there was no possi-
bility that Gulf would solicit opt out requests from the plaintiffs because
Bernard was a Rule 23(b)(2) class action. 95 Finally, the Fifth Circuit ob-
served that Gulf had failed to prove its allegations that the plaintiffs' attor-
neys had misrepresented the "status, purposes and effects" of the action. 96
The degree to which a potential class member is fully apprised of his legal
rights when confronted with the possibility of joining a class suit is subject to
many variables. Often the individual class member runs the risk of making a
87. 619 F.2d at 468.
88. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. POtS. 648 (1955). By
virtue of the institutional framework in which he operates, the function of the censor is to censor.
The author calls it a *'professional interest in finding things to suppress." Id. at 659. Blackstone
expressed similar fears when he said that "[t]o subject the press to the restrictive power of a
licenser . . . is to subject all freedom of sentiment to the prejudices of one man, and make him
the arbitrary and infallible judge of all controverted points in learning, religion and govern-
ment." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 152.
89. See note 57 and accompanying text supra.
90. See note 3 sopra.
91. 619 F.2d at 468.
92. Id. at 472.
93. Id. at 476.
94. Id. at 472-73.
95. Id. at 476.
96. Id. In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Tjoflat noted that Gulf produced only un-
sworn allegations of misconduct against one of the attorneys for the class and those allegations
were denied by the named attorney under oath. Id. at 480 (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
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hasty or uninformed decision to either join the class or not perhaps based
upon one-sided information. Recently, the Second Circuit recognized this
risk when it observed that communications with class members "which are
factually or legally incomplete . . . will surely result in confusion and
adversely affect the administration of justice." 97
The communication ban entered by the district court in Bernard, how-
ever, which presumably was intended to aid the class members, actually
denied them full disclosure of their rights. Effectively, the order denied the
class its right to choose an alternative to the conciliation agreement.9 Recog-
nizing this, the Fifth Circuit emphasized that the choice between the lawsuit
and accepting the conciliation agreement "was for each black employee to
make," and not to be made by the district court. 99
In contrast, the Supreme Court merely observed that the objectionable
scope of the order was illustrated best by the district court's refusal "to
permit mailing of the one notice [plaintiffs] submitted for approval." 0 0 The
Court failed to recognize the tremendous import of the message that was
censored by the district court's order. This failure, coupled with the Court's
refusal to examine the constitutionality of the order, portends a continuation
of the use of censorship in class action litigation.
The Fifth Circuit faced the issue of abuse of the class action squarely and
recognized that constitutional rights cannot be held in abeyance in the belief
that something might happen in the future.' 0' Otherwise, the "immediate,
and irreparable damage" exception to the rule against prior restraints articu-
97. Erhardt v. Prudential Group, Inc., 629 F.2d 843, 846 (2d Cir. 1980).
98. On July 6, 1976, the plaintiffs and their counsel, in compliance with the order of June
22, moved the district court for permission to communicate with putative members of the class so
as to advise them of the existence of a lawsuit as an alternative to signing the conciliation
agreement negotiated by the EEOC and Gulf. The employees had until August 8, 1976, to
decide whether to accept that agreement. The district court waited until August 10 to deny
plaintiffs' motion. 619 F.2d at 464. On paper, of course, the orders allow parties and their
counsel, with prior court approval, to communicate with class members. In Great Western
Cities, Inc. v. Binstein, 476 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. I11. 1979), Judge Boa found that the requirement
of prior court approval of communications "impose[d] no particular hardship" on the parties,
implying that the entire process involves no time delay. Id. at 836. The action by the district
court in Bernard is evidence, however, that this requirement may indeed result in fatal delay.
619 F.2d at 470. See note 77 supra.
99. 619 F.2d at 477.
100. 101 S. Ct. 2201. The Fifth Circuit observed that even as a subsequent restraint, the order
entered by the district court was constitutionally invalid due to its vagueness and overbreadth.
619 F.2d at 477 n.33.
101. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 567 (1976); New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 725-26 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring) (prior restraint of the
Pentagon Papers).
If there is no evidence of misrepresentation, the purpose of gag orders becomes irrelevant and
they do nothing more than place an unnecessary restriction upon the parties and their counsel as
well as upon the first amendment rights of the class members. Further, if an order restricting
communication is entered in a class action it has the added effect of disguising improper
solicitation or misrepresentation that occurred earlier in the litigation and that might not
otherwise be revealed if all communication is stifled.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
lated by Mr. Justice Stewart in New York Times Company v. United States'0 2
would be deemed a rule, not an exception.
Enforcement
Both the Fifth Circuit and Gulf agreed that the district court's order was
intended to be enforced through the contempt power of the court.0 3 It is the
"punishment by contempt" attribute of a prior restraint that distinguishes it
from a criminal statute forbidding some expression. 10 4 A contempt citation
has an "immediate and irreversible" effect, 0 5 while a judgment when a
statute is violated is subject to the due process safeguards of the criminal
justice system, including appellate review. 0 6
The Fifth Circuit suggested three alternatives to contempt: (i) removal of
the offending attorney as class counsel; (ii) denial or withdrawal of class
certification; or (iii) removal of the offending plaintiff as class representa-
tive. 107 The Fifth Circuit rejected each of these, however, because none were
available for use against defendants and their counsel. Thus, the Fifth Cir-
cuit concluded that contempt was the proper sanction. 108
The Fifth Circuit also recognized that it generally is the "lack of proce-
dural safeguards associated with . . . prior restraints"100 that is the central
reason for their unpopularity with the courts. Whether an order is a prior
restraint does not turn solely on whether the sanction is contempt or removal
of counsel, but on the order's impact on constitutional rights. Lack of proce-
dural safeguards, vagueness, and overbreadth, regardless of the sanction, are
clearly elements that militate against the validity of prior restraints.
No Means of Constitutional Challenge
Interwoven in the Fifth Circuit's discussion of the defenses available to one
who violates a prior restraint was an analysis of the direct and immediate
impact of a prior restraint. In fact, under the court's reasoning, the two are
inextricably linked; a litigant who disobeys an injunction is precluded from
raising its constitutional invalidity as a defense. Thus, the prior restraint had
an immediate and irreversible sanction." 0
102. 403 U.S. at 730. New York Times involved the publication by the New York Times and
the Washington Post of the Pentagon Papers that revealed United States government activities
which led to the Vietnam War. The attorneys for the government argued that the publication of
this information while American troops were still engaged in combat in Vietnam endangered the
war effort. The Court rejected the government's argument. See note 127 and accompanying text
infra.
103. 619 F.2d at 468-69. The text of the order did not specify the means of enforcement.
104. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 248 (7th Cir. 1975).
105. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
106. Id.
107. 619 F.2d at 468 n.13.
108. Id. at 468-69.
109. Id. at 469.
110. 619 F.2d at 469.
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The Seventh Circuit disagreed with this reasoning in Chicago Council of
Lawyers, holding that "[t]he validity of court rules... can be challenged by
one prosecuted for violating them . ... '"I' The court based this on a
distinction in that circuit between actions taken by the court in its legislative
role or rule-making capacity, and actions taken in its adjudicative role." 2
The Fifth Circuit has yet to recognize this distinction between court func-
tions. 13
Therefore, while it is arguable that the sanction may not always be
irreversible, it is nonetheless true that a violator is still subject to criminal
contempt proceedings. " 4 Moreover, in the event the prior restraint is eventu-
ally lifted, the immediacy of the restricted speech is lost. 115 As the Fifth
Circuit observed, this loss of impact is "irremediable." ' "
Indeed, the district court's delay in ruling on the plaintiffs' motion to
communicate with the class until August 10, 1976 illustrates this point. Not
only did the court order completely cut off dialogue between the plaintiffs
and their fellow employees, but it did so at a critical time-when the
putative class members were considering whether or not to accept the Gulf/
EEOC conciliation agreement." 7 Conceivably, some of those employees
were not even aware that litigating their grievances with the class was an
alternative to signing the agreement, thus highlighting the Fifth Circuit's
observation that "[f]ragile First Amendment rights are often lost or preju-
diced by delay."" 8
The Speech At Issue Was Constitutionally Protected
While it is clear that a restraint of the type espoused by the Manual is a
prior restraint, it does not mean that the restraint is ipso facto unconstitu-
tional. To date, the Supreme Court has refused to hold that a prior restraint
can never be employed.' 9 The Court has carved out a narrow category of
permissible prior restraints. The order entered by the district court in
Bernard, however, cannot be included among that group.
111. 522 F.2d at 248.
112. Id.
113. The Eastern District of Louisiana, which is in the Fifth Circuit, has accepted this
distinction. See Waldo v. Lakeshore Estates, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 782, 789 (E.D. La. 1977).
114. Criminal contempt is punitive and serves to vindicate the court's authority. It does not
terminate upon compliance with the order. See Compers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S.
418 (1911); In re Timmons, 607 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1979).
115. See note 77 and accompanying text supra.
116. 619 F.2d at 469 (quoting A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 61 (1975)).
117. 619 F.2d at 469-70.
118. 619 F.2d at 470. See also Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976); note
54 supra.
119. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976); Near v. Minnesota ex rel.
Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
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In Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 2 the Supreme Court stated that first
amendment rights are not "absolutely unlimited,"' 2' and listed, in dictum,
three exceptional cases in which the government might limit them by "pre-
vious restraint": (i) to prohibit statements during a time of war which hinder
the war effort or endanger troops; (ii) to censor obscene publications which
offend the "primary requirements of decency"; and (iii) to protect the "secur-
ity of the community life" from incitements to violence or violent overthrow
of the government. 2 2
Today, the most common exception to the general rule that prior restraints
are unconstitutional is the restraint imposed upon expression that is arguably
obscene. In Freedman v. Maryland, 23 the Court held that constitutionally
protected materials may be temporarily restrained for the purpose of screen-
ing out obscenity prior to public distribution. The Court attached the caveat,
however, that the restraint be conducted under procedural safeguards de-
signed to minimize the danger of extreme or permanent censorship. 124 One
commentator suggests that the Court's willingness to tolerate temporary
prior restraints on arguably obscene material does not undermine its basic
concern for the public's right of immediate access to information of a politi-
cal nature. 25
The exception to the rule against prior restraints is also currently invoked
when direct and immediate harm to life or nitional security is involved. Yet,
when in New York Times Co. v. United States' 2 the Supreme Court held
that the Pentagon Papers, which detailed the United States government's role
in the Vietnam War, could be published, it rejected the government's objec-
tions that to do so would imperil national security. The government, the
120. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
121. Id. at 716.
122. Id. Chief Justice Hughes cited Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), as support
for the "nation at war" and sedition exceptions. The obscenity exception was unsupported. One
commentator has suggested that these exceptions are obscure and based on little authority.
Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoas. 648, 661 (1955).
123. 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965).
124. In Freedman, the Court stated that "a noncriminal process which requires the prior
submission of a film to a censor avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes place under
procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system." Id. at 58. In
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975), the Court explained that:
"[A] system of prior restraint runs afoul of the First Amendment if it lacks certain
safeguards: First, the burden of instituting judicial proceedings, and of proving that
the material is [constitutionally] unprotected, must rest on the censor. Second, any
restraint prior to judicial review can be imposed only for a specified brief period and
only for the purpose of preserving the status quo. Third, a prompt final judicial
determination must be assured.
Id. at 560 (emphasis in original).
125. See, Litwack, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 519, 543
(1977).
126. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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Court reasoned, failed to show that publication would surely and immedi-
ately result in grave danger to the nation.
27
Five years after the New York Times decision, Chief Justice Burger, writ-
ing for the majority in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,128 reiterated that first
amendment rights are not absolute and rejected the notion of banning prior
restraints completely.12 9 Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, took
issue with the inference in the majority's opinion that prior restraints might
sometimes be justified to prevent pretrial publicity. The majority's approach,
as Justice Brennan viewed it, threatened to broaden the doctrine of prior
restraint to its pre-New York Times status. 30 While it is true that the doc-
trine allows for some balancing of interests where the likelihood of very grave
harm exists, Chief Justice Burger's language was more general in nature,
possibly reflecting the majority's reluctance to prohibit prior restraints in all
cases. 131
The order entered by the district court in Bernard does not qualify as an
exception under any of these Supreme Court decisions. Because the Supreme
Court based its Bernard decision on nonconstitutional grounds, it has
avoided, for the present, examining whether class action gag orders are prior
restraints. Whether the Court will further broaden the narrow category of
exceptions remains to be seen.
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the Bernard restraint fell within none of
the exceptions allowing prior restraints and declared the order unconstitu-
127. Id. at 714. Professor Litwack observes, however, that the Supreme Court has twice
denied certiorari to cases involving injunctions barring the disclosure by a former member of the
Central Intelligence Agency of information which, in the view of the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals, was highly sensitive to the national defense. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d
1362 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975); United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972). Professor Litwack points out that despite the
Court's rejection in New York Times of the notion that the government's right to protect its
internal secrets is superior to the public's right to receive available political information of
potential importance save in extraordinary situations, the Fourth Circuit successfully applied a
lesser standard of possible impact on national interest in upholding the injunctions. Litwack, The
Doctrine oj Prior Restraint, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 519, 545 n.119 (1977).
128. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
129. Id. at 570. Nebraska Press involved a court order banning pretrial publicity about a
grisly multiple murder. The Court held that the burden of justifying the prior restraint in this
case was not met, especially since the information restrained by the order was part of the public
court record and the order itself was vague and overbroad. Id. at 567-68.
130. Justice Brennan based his position on his reading of the New York Times decision: "[lt]he
exception [to the rule against prior restraint is] to be construed very, very narrowly: when
disclosure 'will surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its
people.' " Id. at 593 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting New York Times Co. v. United States,
403 U.S. 713, 730 (1971) (Stewart, J., joined by White, J., concurring))(emphasis in original).
131. The Chief Justice stated:
[W]e need not rule out the possibility of showing the kind of threat to fair trial rights
that would possess the requisite degree of certainty to justify restraint. This Court
has frequently denied that First Amendment rights are absolute and has consistently
rejected the proposition that a prior restraint can never be employed.
427 U.S. at 569-70.
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tional. The communication interdicted by the challenged order in Bernard
involved solicitation of potential class members to join in racial discrimina-
tion suits in lieu of accepting an extra-judicial conciliation of the dispute.
Since none of the attorneys were to receive compensation from class members
for their services, this was precisely the type of communication found by the
Supreme Court to be constitutionally protected in In re Primus and NAACP
v. Button.
While solicitation of class members in general has been condemned by the
Supreme Court as an abuse of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 132 the Court has modified those rulings when the solicitation was made
by nonprofit organizations that engage in litigation as a vehicle for political
expression as well as a means for communicating useful information to the
public. In re Primus,3 3 and its predecessor, NAACP v. Button,' 34 are two of
the Court's clearest pronouncements in this area. In Button, the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), a nonprofit
organization, litigated and financed lawsuits aimed at desegregating public
schools. In so doing, it represented minority parents and school children who
had been approached about the possibility of litigating their rights by the
NAACP itself. 135
In In re Primus, the nonprofit American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU),
advised a group of women of their legal rights resulting from their steriliza-
tion, which was a condition precedent for them to receive public medical
assistance. In particular, an ACLU attorney represented to one woman the
availability of free legal assistance from the organization. 136 In both deci-
sions, the organizations soliciting litigants stood to receive little or no pecu-
niary gain for representing these individuals. 137 In each case, the Court
balanced the State's interest in regulating the activities of the legal profession
against the first amendment's protection of one's fundamental right "to
obtain meaningful access to the courts." 138 The Court has held that the value
of political expression and associational freedoms may not be abridged by
132. Solicitation is an effort by counsel to specifically seek out persons willing to have a class
action instituted in their name. The Supreme Court has criticized such conduct because it has the
possible effect of "a one-sided presentation" that encourages "speedy and perhaps uninformed
decision making. ... Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 457 (1978). Further, the
Court has observed that "[a] lawyer who engages in personal solicitation of clients may be
inclined to subordinate the best interests of the client to his own pecuniary interests. Even if
unintentionally, the lawyer's ability to evaluate the legal merit of his client's claims may falter
when the conclusion will affect the lawyer's income." Id. at 461 n.19.
133. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
134. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
135. Id. at 421.
136. 436 U.S. at 415-16.
137. Id. at 414-15; 371 U.S. at 420-21. See note 131 supra.
138. 436 U.S. at 426 (citing United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 585
(1971)); 371 U.S. at 438.
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broad regulations designed to curb the abuses inherent in solicitation of class
suits which litigate different claims altogether.139
Like Button and Primus, Bernard involved civil rights issues, the lawyers
had no direct financial stake in the case, and the solicitation was aimed at
providing access to the courts. Under the circumstances, the Fifth Circuit
correctly concluded that the communications barred by the challenged order
were protected expressions which called into play "the full panoply of first
amendment safeguards against prior restraint." 140
The Restraint Met None of the Standards Governing
Restrictions on Constitutionally Protected Expression
Beyond the fact that the Bernard restraint did not fall within any of the
narrowly defined exceptions to the rule against prior restraints, the Fifth
Circuit, after surveying the Supreme Court's decisions in this area, con-
cluded that the restraint met none of the requirements imposed by the Court
on those who seek to justify prior restraints. First, the order was not aimed at
preventing direct, immediate, and irreparable damage. Second, it was not
the least restrictive means of doing so. Finally, there were no procedural
safeguards. 141
139. 436 U.S. 412, 426 (1978); 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963). See also United Transp. Union v.
State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576 (1971); United Mine Workers, Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar
Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377
U.S. 1 (1964). In all of the above cited cases, the groups in question (legal defense attorneys and
labor unions) functioned as service organizations for their members, the persons being solicited.
The purpose behind the soliciting group's activities, one commentator suggests, was to increase
its members' ability to achieve common interests. See Schorr, Class Actions: The Right to Solicit,
16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 215, 225 (1976). Schorr also noted:
On the one hand, the group provided the increased access to the courts which
solicitation would promote and which the group desired; on the other, it stood ready
to protect its members from abuses of solicitation. It was in the association's own self
interest to provide quality legal services and to assure that its members were not
subjected to fraudulent practices .... [T]he group itself provided the protection
and regulation that was the essence of the interest asserted by the state.
Id. (emphasis in original).
140. 619 F.2d at 473. Gulf based its case on unsubstantiated charges of abuse. In its brief to
the Supreme Court, Gulf presented its view of the competing constitutional values at stake in the
litigation. To Gulf, the interests were the constitutionality of a court's authority to enter an order
"recommended by the nation's most experienced jurists and designed to insure against specific
abuses" of the class action versus "generalized first amendment concerns of parties who have
submitted to the court's jurisdiction." Brief for the Petitioners at 28-29.
The plaintiffs' claims were hardly generalized concerns. Regardless, Gulf saw them as unim-
portant because, in attempting to distinguish In re Primus and NAACP v. Button, Gulf inex-
plicably stated: "[t]he order here did not interfere with any constitutional right of access to the
courts since the order was entered during ongoing litigation to manage a complicated class action
that had begun to feel the pressures of abuse." Id. at n.29. If the action had begun to feel such
pressures, it is clear from the record that the abuse was not emanating from the plaintiffs.
Furthermore, Gulf's statement assumes that no right of access was hindered because all potential
and actual class members had already made a decision whether or not to join the litigation. That
clearly was not the case.
141. 619 F.2d at 474.
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The Fifth Circuit held that this order was not brought within any of these
exceptions. On the basis of the facts before it, the Fifth Circuit concluded
that the order arose not as a result of any immediate need, but out of the
"general context of the administration of justice and the particular context of
Rule 23." 142 Mere interest in the "proper administration of justice," however,
does not authorize the judiciary to impose "any blanket exception to the first
amendment." 14
3
The district court's purpose in entering the order in Bernard was the
prevention of class action abuses. The Manual adheres to the same theory of
prevention. As the Fifth Circuit pointed out, however, the frequency and
effect of genuine abuses in class actions is nowhere collected in any empirical
data. 144 Further, the Manual itself expressly recognizes that abuse of the class
action is an exception and not the rule.' 45 The Manual's intent is to anticipate
and prevent such "infrequent occurrences before they happen."146 Clearly,
the district court's entry of this prophylactic measure where, as here, the
potential abuse was never proven, 147 was improper in light of the require-
ment that a prior restraint is only justified in exceptional circumstances and
upon a showing of "direct, immediate and irreparable harm." 14
In addition, there was no showing in Bernard that reasonable alternatives
that would have had a lesser impact on free expression were unavailable. 49
Further, a prior restraint must be narrowly drawn. In particular, the Fifth
Circuit criticized the breadth of the gag order'5 0 and the requirement that
parties and counsel petition the court for approval prior to communicating
with the class. 15 Finally, the Fifth Circuit was especially critical of the
order's failure to meet the last exception to the rule against prior restraint
requiring procedural safeguards. The court indicated that there was no
evidence of abuse, no way to test the potential abuse premise, no findings of
particular abuses present or threatened, and no conclusion of law.15
2
142. Id. at 474.
143. Id. (quoting Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 508 F.2d 152, 163 (3d Cir. 1975)). In
Rodgers, the court held that the fair and orderly administration of justice does not mitigate the
general presumption against prior restraints. 508 F.2d at 163. See also note 123 supra.
144. 619 F.2d at 476.
145. The MANUAL provides:
It must be noted, however, that, generally, the experience of the courts in class
actions has been favorable. The aforementioned abuses are the exceptions in class
action litigation rather than the rule. Nevertheless, they support the idea that it is
appropriate to guard against the occurrence of these relatively rare abuses by local
rule or order.
MANUAL, supra note 2, at 31.




150. "The order ... suppresses essentially everything .... Id. See 619 F.2d at 477 n.33.
151. 619 F.2d at 477. See also note 57 and accompanying text supra.
152. 619 F.2d at 477. While these deficiencies are criticized in only one portion of the Fifth




Unlike the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court confined itself to a decision
that condemned the district court's abuse of discretion in misusing Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 53 The Court observed that the district
court had used the order to extinguish communication at a critical point for
the black employees in the class action and that the order was based on
nonexistent and unsubstantiated grounds.
54
Content with those findings, the Supreme Court refused to broaden its
review to examine the dangers of plenary restraints on speech within the class
action vehicle. 55 If it had, the Court would have had no choice but to follow
the Fifth Circuit's reasoning and invalidate the order entered in Bernard as
unconstitutional. The Bernard gag order was squarely struck down by the
Fifth Circuit because that court recognized what the Supreme Court did
not-that the order was not only vague, overbroad, and lacking in proce-
dural safeguards, but most importantly, it interfered with constitutionally
protected speech. 56
If the Supreme Court had rendered a constitutional decision, the opinion
would have had the effect of striking down those local district court rules
that restrict communication in class actions because most local rules are
virtually identical to the district court's order in Bernard. 57 Each of those
local rules is an attempt by the district courts to manage class litigation from
afar. The continued use of the rules represents a complete disregard by those
courts for the unique factual and legal characteristics endemic to every class
and to every class action.
A careful reading of the Manual's suggested Rule 1.41, upon which most of
the local rules are based, reveals that even after class certification all parties
and their counsel are forbidden, without prior court approval, to communi-
cate "with any potential or actual class member not a party."'' 58 In other
words, class counsel may not communicate with class members they are
supposed to represent without prior court approval. The implications of this
broad ban are staggering. While it is quite likely that most courts would not
forbid routine communication between counsel and the class, the approval
requirement still inhibits crucial contact between attorney and client. With-
out filing a proposed communication with the court for approval, the class
member is the only one who may initiate contact.
The order suggested by the Manual and adopted by the district court in
Bernard provides that no communication protected by a constitutional right
153. 101 S. Ct. at 2201.
154. Id. at 2201-02.
155. 101 S. Ct. at 2199. In dicta, however, the Court, perhaps recognizing that its decision in
Bernard would not resolve but rather add to the confusion in this area, observed: "the mere
possibility of abuses does not justify routine adoption of a communication bar that interferes with
the formation of a class .... " Id. at 2202.
156. See notes 91-95 & 131-38 and accompanying text supra.
157. See notes 3, 6 supra.
158. MANUAL, supra note 2, at 187. See also note 3 supra.
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may be forbidden by the ban as long as the court receives a copy of the
communication within five days after its occurrence.151 It is clear that such a
provision is mandated by the Supreme Court's holdings in Button and In re
Primus. i6 0 But this provision, standing alone, cannot insure that the holdings
of those decisions will be followed. The history of the Bernard litigation at
the district court level suggests the contrary. 161
The communication at issue in Bernard fell squarely within the constitu-
tional parameters established in Button and In re Primus. Consequently,
plaintiffs' counsel should have been able to communicate with the class,
subject only to the order's requirement that they file with the court a copy or
summary of the communication "five days after such communication."'' 2
Instead, the district court subjected the communication to before-the-fact
scrutiny, ultimately insuring the nearly total defeat of the class action. 6 3
Both the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court recognized that the district
court had misused the gag order. The Fifth Circuit, however, based its
holding on constitutional grounds while the Supreme Court confined itself to
a strict reading of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. While
each court attacked in some way the Manual's ban on communication,
neither court discussed why there is no need for the Manual's suggested
restraint. All of the abuses that the rule is supposed to prevent can be avoided
without resort to an undesirable prior restraint.
Even without the gag order, attorneys for both the class and the defend-
ants are bound by Supreme Court decisions regarding solicitation and by the
Canons of Ethics that prohibit misrepresentation. As NAACP v. Button and
In re Primus make clear, solicitation on behalf of a bona-fide, nonprofit
organization that pursues litigation as a vehicle for effective political expres-
sion and association is protected by the first amendment.6 4 Those holdings
should be read in light of Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, which held that a
lawyer's solicitation of business for financial gain is only "marginally affected
with First Amendment concerns" and may properly be regulated by the
states. 165
Furthermore, all lawyers are bound by the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility, which forbids engaging in "conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, de-
ceit, or misrepresentation."' 66 Naturally, this prohibition extends to attor-
neys in class actions and forbids misrepresentations to the class regarding the
159. MANUAL, supra note 2, at 188. See also note 3 supra.
160. See notes 91-95 & 131-38 and accompanying text supra.
161. See note 57 and accompanying text supra.
162. See note 3 supra (emphasis added); MANUAL, supra note 2, at 188. Even this provision
would have failed under the Fifth Circuit's analysis, which held that even as a subsequent
restraint the order was constitutionally invalid due to its vagueness and overbreadth. 619 F.2d at
477 n.33.
163. See note 57 and accompanying text supra.
164. See notes 131-38 and accompanying text supra.
165. 436 U.S. at 459.
166. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(4) (1979).
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status or the effect of the suit. In Disciplinary Rule 7-104, the Code also
prohibits defense counsel from communicating with a party known to be
represented by a lawyer, and cautions lawyers to advise a party of adverse
interest who is not represented by a lawyer, to seek counsel.16 7 Once a class
has been certified and a member chooses to remain in the class, that member
is represented by the class counsel. Since DR7-104 prohibits a defense attor-
ney from communicating with a party of adverse interest who is represented
by counsel, an attorney for the defense who attempted to misrepresent the
status or effect of the suit to an actual class member would be sanctioned for
violating not only the Code sections prohibiting misrepresentation but DR 7-
104 as well. 68 The Code accomplishes what the suggested order attempts to
do and does so without imposing a blanket unconstitutional prior restraint.
CONCLUSION
By failing to recognize the clear record of abuse and issuing a nonconstitu-
tional decision, the Supreme Court has compounded the confusion among
the circuits regarding class action litigation. District courts are still free to
impose communication bans in class actions. Even though these orders re-
semble none of the exceptions to the rule against prior restraints previously
articulated by the Supreme Court, 6 9 the Court's decision in Bernard allows
these orders to enjoy that status. Fortunately, the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in
Bernard is being adopted by more district judges who recognize that these
communication bans are invalid prior restraints. 170 Furthermore, some dis-
trict courts whose local rules contained orders modeled on the order sug-
gested by the Manual have vacated or amended those rules for the reasons
expressed by the Fifth Circuit in Bernard.171 These courts recognize that the
potential for abuse in class actions is minor in comparison to the first amend-
ment dangers posed by such blanket orders and that such abuses can be
regulated by other means.
167. See text accompanying note 48 supra. See also note 50 supra.
168. See note 48 supra. In promulgating the Bernard decision, the Fifth Circuit drew no
distinction between pre and post-certification communications between the counsel or parties
and the class members. At present, it is unclear whether DR 7-104 would prevent defense counsel
from communicating with class members either (1) prior to class certification or (2) after
certification but prior to the members' decisions on whether to remain in the class. The Impervi-
ous Paint court held that between the filing of the class action and the close of the opt out period
once certification is granted, defense counsel must treat plaintiff class members as represented by
the class counsel and conduct themselves accordingly. See note 50 supra.
169. See notes 118-30 and accompanying text supra.
170. Kilgo v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 88 F.R.D. 592 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Garside v. Everest &
Jennings, No. S-80-82 MLS (E.D. Cal. 1980). Even the drafters of the Manual, in the 1981 draft
of the proposed new Manual, have not abandoned their 1977 observation that "generally, the
experience of the courts in class actions has been favorable. . . . [A]buses are the exceptions in
class action litigation rather than the rule." 1981 DRAFT-MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, at
75.
171. The following local district court rules have been vacated or amended in light of
Bernard: N.D. I11. 22; D. Md. 20; and M.D. N.C. 17(b)(6).
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For the present, the Supreme Court has avoided the task of analyzing the
constitutionality of blanket communication bans in class actions. When the
Court is again presented with the opportunity to rule in this area, the Court
could have no finer model upon which to base its reasoning than the Fifth
Circuit's scholarly decision in Bernard. The Supreme Court may then real-
ize, as did the Fifth Circuit, that the true abuse of the class action device
arises not from communication between counsel and the class, but from the
imposition of blanket communication bans upon constitutionally protected
speech. Supreme Court precedent on prior restraints served as the Fifth
Circuit's guide when it issued its decision. If the Court allows itself to be
guided by its past decisions, it too will recognize that blanket communication
bans, like that suggested by the Manual for Complex Litigation, clearly
violate the first amendment and disrupt the entire class action process.
Mary Dempsey
